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BOND REFERENDA IN MAINE AND OTHER STATES

What Bonds Hold?
An Examination of Statewide Bond Referenda in Maine and Other States
by James P. Melcher
Since 1990, Maine has held votes on statewide bond referenda than any other state. In this article, James Melcher
tackles three main questions: (1) How often do voters approve bond proposals in Maine, and how does this compare
to other states? (2) Are some types of bond referenda more likely to pass than others? (3) Does a bond’s placement
on the ballot make it more, or less, likely to pass?

Several times a decade, Maine and other states hold
a variety of votes on statewide issues. Typically, the initiatives and referenda that draw the most attention are votes
on controversial issues such as bear hunting, same-sex
marriage, and gun control. But another type of statewide
referendum vote, while usually less controversial and
little publicized, can have great importance for a state’s
finances and its ability to fund a variety of long-range
projects: statewide bond referenda. There is no better
opportunity for voters to shape how their states spend
their tax dollars. These elections have received relatively
little attention from the media and from scholars alike.
So, this article will address the following questions:
1. How often do voters approve bond proposals
in Maine, and how does this compare to other
states?
2. Are some types of bond referenda—say, transportation bonds—more likely to pass than are
others?
3. Does the spot on the ballot in which a particular
bond appears make it more, or less, likely to pass?
PREVIOUS RESEARCH

T

here has not been much research on statewide bond
elections, but related issues have been studied extensively. For instance, there has been extensive research
over the past 50 years on local bond elections, especially school bond elections. Edward Muir and Krista
Schneider published the most widely cited scholarly

MAINE POLICY REVIEW

•

Vol. 25, No. 2

•

2016



article on statewide bond referenda in 1999, which
examined statewide bond referenda from 1980 to 1990.
They found that 75 percent of the bonds in that period
passed and there appeared to be a trend of increased
support for such referenda, which received an average
of 56 percent of the vote. Their other findings included
decreased support for any given initiative the more such
issues appeared on the ballot and that certain types
of referenda outperformed others. Bonds supporting
health and human services, followed by transportation
bonds, received the highest share of the vote, with a
whopping 97 percent of health and human services
bonds passing. In contrast, bonds for parks and historic
preservation, along with bonds for judicial and correctional facilities, fared the worst, with passage rates close
to 50 percent. Another study by Leslie McGranahan
(1998) covering statewide bond referenda from 1968 to
1998 offers similar findings, both on the overall success
rate of bond passage and on the types of bonds that are
more likely to win.
Importance of Ballot Order
There has not been much research on ballot order
and bond elections. The order in which candidates,
parties, or issues appear on a ballot may seem trivial to
the casual observer. However, fears of being disadvantaged by an unfavorable spot on the ballot, or concerns
that election officials did not act properly, have led to
many lawsuits in recent years in several states. Although
the public might pay little attention to the controversy
of ballot order, political scientists have been studying it
since the 1920s. Many studies argue that first place on
the ballot has a small positive effect on vote share in a
53
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variety of elections, especially in races with large fields,
nonpartisan races, or races with high turnout (Chen et
al. 2014; Meredith and Salant 2011). Other research
claims that the candidates listed last on the ballot may
have an advantage similar to that enjoyed by the candidates who are listed first (Koppell and Steen 2004).
Although research on ballot order has not been
conducted for statewide bond referenda, research offers
some clues about what we might expect. The effects of
ballot order are more likely to appear in primary elections than in general elections, in part because voters do
not get to separate candidates out by party label in these
races (Koppell and Steen 2004). Similarly, nonpartisan
races are also more likely to see ballot-order effects
(Alvarez, Sinclair, and Hasen 2006). In both primary
elections and nonpartisan races, voters are responding to
electoral choices in which they lack the information and
partisan cues that are available in a more visible race with
candidates for president or governor on the ballot. Since
bond referenda often do not provide much information
for voters and are always nonpartisan, they are exactly the
type of race in which ballot-order effects would be relatively likely. Unlike a crowded primary field where voters
usually are asked to choose one candidate from a list of
many, in state bond referenda voters are usually asked to
make one choice after another to approve spending
money on a series of bond packages. Just as a parent
might finally say “no” to the fourth request by a child for
a favor, voters may do likewise and be more likely to say
“no” to the bond referenda lower on the ballot.

…bonds already enjoy a
broad level of support even
before they get on the ballot.
In Maine, initiatives are given higher numbers
(e.g., “Issue 1”) than referenda, so bond referenda are
always listed on the ballot after initiatives. According
to a press release by the Maine Secretary of State’s
Office (August 30, 2013), “Maine law…requires the
questions to be organized on the ballot by category as
follows: people’s veto questions first, then citizen initiatives, followed by bond questions, referendum questions proposed by the Legislature, and finally, resolutions
to amend the state Constitution.”
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Expectations about Maine
What should we expect to find about state bond
elections in Maine? We would expect, above all, that
most bonds would pass. Furthermore, the research on
other types of elections would suggest that ballot-order
effects would be relatively likely to appear in statewide
bond elections. In most cases, these elections are
low-visibility races, overshadowed by campaigns up
the ticket, and like most nonpartisan elections, they
are lower-information races than partisan ones.
Additionally, transportation bonds in Maine have had
a reputation as hard to beat (Russell 2013; Goble
2013), so we can expect that will be the case in this
study. As a Bangor Daily News (December 18, 2009)
editorial noted, “people intuitively understand that
commerce relies on strong transportation links; that’s
why transportation bond requests almost always win
approval at the polls.”
Timing of Bond Referenda
Research shows that school bond votes do better
when major election choices (president, governor, US
senator) are not on the ballot because motivated school
supporters turn out even when the big races are not on
the ballot. One study found that school bond referenda
passed at a rate almost 20 percentage points higher in
odd years (when major elections are not on the ballot)
than in even years (when major races are more likely on
the ballot) (Meredith 2009).
Why Do Bonds Tend to Pass?
Unlike ballot initiatives, which may reflect the
position of a vocal minority, Maine state bonds must
be approved by a supermajority of both legislative
houses, with further authorization needed by the
governor in some cases. This suggests that bonds
already enjoy a broad level of support even before they
get on the ballot. Another key reason for bond success
is that backers of a particular bond referendum typically organize and campaign to publicize their cause.
Unlike nearly all other types of elections, however,
statewide bond referenda seldom spur organized
opposition.
Maine Compared to Other States
In the period from 1990 through 2014, Maine held
more votes on statewide bonds than any other state.
Why? First, most other states have constitutional hurdles
in place as a check on state borrowing and bonding.
54

BOND REFERENDA IN MAINE AND OTHER STATES

These have been common since the Panic of 1837, which
left many states unable to pay off bonds that they had
issued in large numbers following New York’s success
with its bond-supported Erie Canal project. In 1842,
Rhode Island became the first state to put limits on state
bonding in its constitution (McGranahan 1998).
Additionally, many states use other means besides public
approval to limit bonding such as limiting guaranteed
debt to a percentage of a certain dollar amount (for
example, a percentage of state tax revenue). While
current data are difficult to find, as of 1996, only 20
other states featured statewide bond referenda (Kiewiet
and Szakaly 1996). Maine has long been a leader in
offering a relatively high number of bond referenda.
McGranahan (1998) found that Maine accounted for
20.1 percent of all statewide bond referenda between
1968 and 1988; Maine was a part of a group of five states
in that era (which includes California and Rhode Island,
two states discuss later in this article) that accounted for
almost 80 percent of all state bond referenda.
Another reason for Maine’s large share of statewide
bond referenda is that the Maine Constitution sets a
relatively low threshold for requiring voter approval for
bonds. Maine general obligation bonds that borrow
more than $2 million require public approval (except
under unusual circumstances). The constitutional limit
on Maine state borrowing was raised to $2 million in
1934, and until 1950, the only way Maine could borrow
more than that was to amend its Constitution. Several
measures that passed in Maine during the first half of
the twentieth century that look like modern bond referenda were actually state constitutional amendments.
(Some states—Alabama, for example—still pass bonds
by passing a constitutional amendment for each one.)
Concerns about constitutional clutter led to an amendment of Article IX, Section 14 of the Maine State
Constitution in 1950. Now, to borrow more than $2
million, a supermajority (two-thirds of both houses) of
the legislature (after negotiating the details of the bond
packages with the governor) must pass the package,
which then goes to approval by voters. A simple majority
is required for passage by the voters (Tinkle 2013).
THE STUDY

T

he best state for comparing bond referenda to
Maine is Rhode Island, partly because Rhode
Island has among the highest number of statewide bond
referenda in recent years and because it is the only other
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New England state that holds bond referenda. I have
identified all 379 cases of bond referenda in the United
States between 1990 and 2014 and compared the
winning percentages of the nation as a whole to Maine
and Rhode Island. The question, then, is, Will these two
states be typical of the rest of the nation, or will they be
outliers not just in how often they vote on bond referenda, but on how they vote on them, too?
This article presents information on bond referenda
elections that authorized new spending in Rhode Island
and Maine from 1990 to 2014 and basic data about the
outcomes of statewide bond elections nationally from
that same period. The article also examines the proposition that ballot position may play a role in victory (in
particular that being listed first may be advantageous).
Finally, the paper examines whether certain types of
bond referenda (particularly transportation bonds)
experience greater success than other types of bonds.

Maine has long been a leader
in offering a relatively high
number of bond referenda.

THE NATIONAL PICTURE

I

compiled every statewide referendum issuing specific
bonds from 1990 to 2014, as listed on National
Council of State Legislatures’ Ballot Measures Database.1
During that period, 25 states held a total of 379 statewide bond referenda (Table 1).
This average of 79.2 percent represents a slightly
higher percentage of victory than in the Muir and
Schneider (1999) research, which found that 76 percent
of the 319 statewide bond votes passed between 1978
and 1990. (However, they also predicted that based on
recent bond referendum success, the rate of bond victory
was likely to go up in the future).
Maine and Rhode Island held more bond referenda
over this period than any other states (with California in
third place). Both Maine and Rhode Island have low
thresholds for issuing statewide bonds without voter
approval ($2 million and $4 million, respectively), so in
55
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Table 1

Success or Failure of Statewide Bond
Referenda by State, 1990–2014

State

Win

Lose

Percentage
passing

Maine

84

19

81.6

Rhode Island

54

14

79.4

Alabama

7

0

100.0

Alaska

7

0

100.0

Arizona

1

0

100.0

Arkansas

6

0

100.0

California

41

26

61.2

Colorado

1

2

33.3

Hawaii

7

1

87.5

Louisiana

1

0

100.0

Michigan

2

0

100.0

Missouri

3

1

75.0

Nevada
New Jersey
New York
New Mexico

3

0

100.0

12

2

85.7

3

1

75.0

29

5

85.3

North Carolina

5

0

100.0

Ohio

8

2

80.0

Oregon

0

1

0

Pennsylvania

2

0

100.0

Texas

19

2

90.5

Utah

0

1

0

Virginia

2

0

100.0

Washington

1

1

50.0

West Virginia

2

1

66.7

ME/RI

139

32

81.3

Others

162

46

77.9

TOTAL

300

77

79.2

(N=379)

other states a bond may not require a referendum.
Maine and Rhode Island are not necessarily borrowing
more money than other states or even more money per
capita; rather, they are seeking voter approval more
often because they have to do so. In fact, Kiewiet and
Szakaly (1996) found that states that require state bond
approval take on a smaller percentage of debt than states
that borrow money with other procedures.
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California: The Big Outlier in Bond Elections

While Maine and Rhode Island have held more
bond referenda over the past 24 years than other states,
the percentages of the bonds approved in these two
states are close to both each other and the average of the
other states, with all three figures clustering around 80
percent. By contrast, the chief outlier among the states
with enough cases from which to make inferences is
California, which has passed bond referenda at a rate
about 20 percentage points lower than the other 25
states. Why? The biggest reason is California’s bond
elections commonly have two features not common in
other states: bonds that come attached to major policy
changes and counterinitiatives, a practice in which
“business groups and issue activists increasingly propose
alternative initiatives to counter those they oppose”
including bonds (Kruse 2001: 142). A good example
featuring both phenomena was “Big Green,” a major
environmental bond and policy change which gained
only 35.7 percent of the vote in a heated, expensive
contest in 1990 (Skelton 1990).
Like most states, Maine and Rhode Island place
bonds with a limited focus on the ballot. The bonds do
not introduce new policies; they simply request money
for a particular category of projects. As such, there is
relatively little incentive for groups to oppose these votes
because they offer either incremental change or money
to maintain the status quo. It is unlikely that the
California trend of mixing bonds with other policy
proposals will be seen in Maine and Rhode Island.
BOND ELECTIONS IN RHODE ISLAND

S

ince 1990, Rhode Island has held elections to authorize 68 different bond proposals for new spending.
Unlike Maine, Rhode Island’s bond referenda are only
held during November general elections in even-numbered years, ensuring a relatively high turnout compared
to elections held at other times. Like other states, Rhode
Island has passed the most proposed bonds: 54 of the
68 bonds in this period passed (79.4 percent). Although
this percentage is high, it may understate the current
probability of bond passage in the Ocean State because
it includes a period in which numerous bonds were
defeated. These defeats were most pronounced in 1992
when four of the five bonds on the ballot were defeated;
three of those four did not even reach 40 percent
support. Across the elections of 1992, 1994, and 1996,
eight bonds won and nine were defeated. Since then,
56
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only five statewide bond votes have lost in Rhode
Island, with a bond passage record of 39 (wins) to 4
(losses) (90.5 percent). Only one statewide bond has
been defeated in Rhode Island since 2006, and that one
defeated bond—a $4 million bond to “restore, improve
and expand recreational facilities at the Fort Adams
State Park in Newport” (Winograd 2006)—received
49.4 percent of the vote.
Why did Rhode Island have such a tough period for
bond votes in the early 1990s? First, the national
economy soured after 1991. Second, at that time Rhode
Island voters had extra cause to be skeptical of new
government spending for three reasons: recent government corruption and abuse of power; Rhode Island’s
high level of per capita debt; and criticism of bond
spending by a prominent business group (Donovan
1994; Jones 1992). Also, in 1990, Rhode Island voters
passed the highest amount of debt in bond referenda in
the state’s history ($197 million), which may have made
voters in the next two elections hesitant to add more
(Garland 1996).
BOND ELECTIONS IN MAINE

F

rom 1990 to 2014, Maine held statewide referenda on 103 proposed bonds. Of these, 84 bonds
(81.6 percent) won. Unlike Rhode Island, Maine can
hold bond elections at any time of year. While many
of Maine’s bond referenda are held in November
of even-numbered years, they are more common in
November general elections in odd-numbered years.
The timing of these elections matters because referendum supporters—who are particularly motivated to
show up—are advantaged when elections are held when
other voters are less likely to vote. Examples include
non-November elections, when primary elections are
being held, and in odd-numbered years, when candidates for president and governor are not on the ballot
(Anzia 2011).
Presidential election years in Maine, as elsewhere,
draw the most voters, followed by gubernatorial general
election years, with other election years well behind.
The people who vote in these nongeneral elections differ
from those who turn out for more publicized races,
which might help bond referenda do better in such
races. Following this theory, we would expect that bond
referenda in Maine do best in elections without a
general election, followed by in November elections
when there is no general election for president or
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governor, then by gubernatorial general elections, and
finally presidential election years. Table 2 shows that
this tends to be in the case.
Since 1989, Rhode Island has only held statewide
bond referenda in November general elections in
even-numbered years (Garland 1996), but the pattern is
similar to Maine’s: a slightly higher level of success for
gubernatorial year votes (27–5, 84.4 percent) than for
presidential year votes (28–8, 77.8 percent). Table 3
adds Rhode Island bond numbers to Table 2.
So while bond elections held at any time are likely
to succeed, they win more often as turnout goes down
from higher-participation elections to lower ones.
Winning Bond Issues
Maine shows similar patterns in its statewide bond
elections to Rhode Island. In both states, most types of
bonds have a high winning percentage and a high
average percentage of the vote. Table 4 presents bonds
divided into several basic types and listed in descending
Table 2:

Success of Maine Bond Referenda
by Month and Type of Election Year,
1990–2014

Won–lost

Percentage
winning

November, presidential
election year

10–5 (N=15)

66.7

November, gubernatorial
election year

20–8 (N=28)

71.4

November, neither

39–7 (N=46)

84.8

January or June

15–0 (N=15)

100.0

Month

Table 3:

Success of Bond Referenda in
Maine and Rhode Island by Month
and Type of Election Year

Won–lost

Percentage
winning

November, presidential
election year

38–13 (N=51)

74.5

November, gubernatorial
election year

47–13 (N=60)

78.3

November, neither

39–7 (N=46)

84.8

January or June

15–0 (N=15)

100.0

Month
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Table 4:

Maine and Rhode Island Statewide
Bond Referenda Outcomes by Type,
1990–2014

Bond type

Number

Mean
percentage
of vote

Won–lost
(%)

Natural resources
Maine

34

28–6

(82.4)

58.4

Rhode Island

15

13–2

(86.7)

64.6

Total

49

41–8 (83.7)

60.3

18

15–3

63.3

Transportation
Maine

(80.0)

Rhode Island

13

13–0 (100.0)

64.6

Total

31

28–3 (90.3)

63.9

Maine

20

16–4

(80.0)

55.4

Rhode Island

15

15–0 (100.0)

59.6

Total

35

31–4

(88.6)

57.2

Education

Economic development
Maine
Rhode Island
Total

18

16–2

(88.9)

55.3

5

3–2

(60.0)

52.4

23

19–4

(82.6)

54.9

8

3–5

(37.5)

46.8

5

1–4

(20.0)

41.1

8

3–5

(37.5)

49.8

11

4–9

(30.8)

47.5

Arts/historical
Rhode Island
State facilities
Maine
Rhode Island
Total
Health
Maine

6

6–0 (100.0)

57.8

Rhode Island

1

1–0 (100.0)

66.0

Total

7

7–0 (100.0)

58.1

3

3–0 (100.0)

56.3

2

2–0 (100.0)

59.1

Public housing*
Rhode Island
Agriculture
Maine

* The public housing category includes one bond
referendum in Rhode Island, which would have
supported funding for both public housing and
state land acquisition.
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order of frequency: natural resources (purchase of public
lands, environmental protection, water quality); transportation; education; economic development; arts and
history (such as historic preservation projects for historic
buildings); state facilities (such as rehabbing current
state office buildings, prison construction, personnel
training); health (such as state support for construction
at medical research facilities); public housing; and agriculture.
Table 4 shows just how well most types of bond
referenda did at the polls, but at the same time confirms
Muir and Schneider’s (1999) observation that voters are
sensitive to the type of bond they are approving. Work
on state buildings, for example, proved unpopular in
both states. In the 1990s, each state soundly rejected
bonds that would have renovated state buildings to
bring them into compliance with Occupational Health
and Safety Administration (OSHA) regulations.
Additionally, votes for building at correctional facilities
also fared badly.
Transportation Bonds
Transportation bonds have a reputation as being the
most bulletproof bonds in Maine. Transportation bonds
in Maine and Rhode Island were victorious 90 percent of
the time and had the highest average percentage of the
vote (63.9 percent). Yet, Table 4 shows that other categories of bonds also perform well (education, natural
resources, economic development, and health).
Why is this? First, nearly all bonds perform well
under normal circumstances, so it is hard for one type
to appear distinctively successful when the overall
average success rate hovers around 80 percent. The case
of the three failed transportation bonds, however, is a
good example of the proposition that voters support
bonds in which they can see a personal benefit and may
not support them if they do not see a personal benefit.
An editorial in the Westerly Sun (October 30, 2014)
written just before the election noted this tendency in
Rhode Island:

However, even though the last zoo bond easily
passed eight years ago, the record has shown that
standalone projects are more vulnerable to voter
rejection than bonds that cast a wider net. In the
last 10 general elections since 1994, the voters
have approved 41 of the 52 bond issues….Those
that have failed were most often individual buildings or projects like the 2000 election’s Heritage
Harbor Museum bonds for Providence. The last
58
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bond to be voted down in Rhode Island was in
2006, $4 million for renovations at Fort Adams
State Park.
Presumably, what most voters want out of transportation bonds is better roads that they can use. Voters
may not see transportation projects intended chiefly for
business use or facilities for the state transportation
department as directly beneficial to them. All three
transportation bonds that failed in Maine since 1990
were these sorts of bonds. The losing bonds (in November
1992 and 1994) dealt with matters such as port facilities
(rejected twice), removing oil tanks and building salt
and sand facilities for the Maine Department of
Transportation, and restoring freight rail service in three
Maine counties. Some of these bonds also had other
obstacles. The failed 1994 bond, at $21.3 million, was
the most expensive on the ballot. The two transportation bonds that failed in 1992, however, were the two
cheapest bonds on the ballot out of six, while the most
expensive (a $42 million bond issue “to create and
protect jobs through capital improvements in transportation facilities”) passed. The single worst bond issue
performance at the ballot box in either state was the
1992 transportation bond to repair and improve municipal port facilities, with barely one voter in four (25.4
percent) backing it. Of course, the early 1990s were an
exceptionally difficult time to get any bonds passed in
Rhode Island or Maine. Transportation bonds normally
win, but particularly if they offer motorists the promise
of better roads.
Even with roads, however, when voters perceive a
measure as benefitting only one relatively sparsely
populated part of the state, the bond can fail. An
example from the late 1960s and early 1970s is instructive. Two measures designed to improve Maine Route 6,
a two-lane state highway that stretches across Maine
from Vanceboro to the Quebec border north of Jackman,
failed. According to the Milo Town Crier (August 31,
1967), supporters hoped that an upgraded Route 6
would attract international through-traffic from Canada
and spur economic development along its corridor. In a
letter to the editor of the same paper, Ronald “Tinker”
Richards (Town Crier, August 31, 1967) anticipated
the opposition a project directly benefitting only part of
the state can receive. His directed his critique at the
Maine State Jaycees, who voted to support all of the
1967 bond referenda except the one for Route 6, which
travels through Milo, but his plea is one that could be
echoed by many other referenda with a local benefit:
MAINE POLICY REVIEW
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As an ex-President of the Milo Jaycees, I would
like to apologize for the action of the State
Jaycees who voted to support all questions
on the up-coming referendum except the one
concerning the repair of Route 6. The majority
of the State Jaycee membership is consolidated
in Southern and urban areas of the state…. It
would seem that they are not interested in the
improvement of any part of the state other than
their own.…It is a shame if the Maine Jaycees
begrudge the central area of the state $3,000,000
for “improving hazardous conditions on Route
6” which cuts from east to west right through
the center of the state….This particular area
needs the boost that a good highway would
provide. In this state we have got to learn to
share. If only those with children in school voted
for money for education, if only those who fly
voted for airport money, if only Bangor residents voted money for the retarded center and
only Lewiston-Auburn voted for their bridge,
it is highly unlikely that anybody would get
anything. I wonder if the Maine Jaycees have
thought about that.
The 1967 referendum, which would have spent $3
million on improvements to Route 6, failed, getting
The November 2016 election brought many changes
to Maine—legalization of marijuana, ranked-choice
voting, Maine’s first electoral vote split since it
adopted the district plan in 1969, and the first
Republican electoral vote from the Pine Tree state
since 1988. One thing did not change, however:
a transportation bond referendum won in a landslide. Issue 6 was the only bond issue on Maine’s
2016 ballot, and it called for $100 million to support
transportation in the state. As usual, no major organized opposition arose for the transportation bond,
unlike most initiative proposals on the ballot. The
bond referendum outperformed all five initiatives,
receiving 61.2 percent of the vote and carrying all
16 Maine counties. Even Piscataquis County, which
voted “no” on all five initiatives, gave Issue 6 a
slender victory with 51 percent of the vote. Looking
down the road, there’s no reason to expect that
Maine voters will put up a stop sign anytime soon in
transportation bond votes.3
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only 44.1 percent of the vote. Three years later, backers
of a $30 million proposal for Route 6 experienced one
of the worst electoral defeats in Maine bond history
when the bond garnered only 28.5 percent of the vote.2
In the same era, bonds for other narrowly defined transportation projects also failed: bridge and causeways for
Chebeague Island (1963), dock facilities on Matinicus
Island (1969), airport improvements at the AuburnLewiston and Oxford County airports (1972), and a
proposed toll bridge between Waterville and Winslow
(1972). A bridge project connecting Lewiston and
Auburn lost in both 1951 and 1967, before finally
passing in 1968 (http://legislature.maine.gov/9198/).
Since 1972, most transportation bonds have funded
projects statewide and have had a high degree of success.

be known as Issue 4, but, it is coded here as position “1”
because that is where it is on the bond list. Table 5 examines the won–lost record and winning percentage of bond
referenda by ballot position in both states.
The first three ballot positions are relatively similar
in voter support. Additional choices generally and gradually lose a small amount of success and vote share as
voters go down the ballot. However, these data do not
show a clear cut-off point after which voter support
drops sharply. Muir and Schneider (1999) argued that
the more statewide bonds voters have to choose from,
the lower the chance that any of them would win, and
the findings from my analysis are consistent with that.
However, it is possible for bonds to win from any position on the ballot relative to other bonds, even in a
crowded field. In 2004, when Rhode Island voters faced
choices on 12 bonds, they approved all but two of them.
On the other hand, there were cases in which the lone
bond referendum on the ballot lost. It is not clear that
voters are more cautious about voting for referenda
simply because there are a high number of them.

Effect of Ballot Positions
I coded each bond according to where it appeared on
the list of bonds—which is not necessarily the number it
appeared under on the ballot. For example, the first bond
listed on the ballot might come after three initiatives and

Narrowly Focused Bonds
Table 5:

Position
among
bonds

Bond Ballot Position in Maine and Rhode Island,
1990–2014, with Winning Percentage and Average
Vote Share

Won–lost and winning percentage (%)

Average percentage
of vote

Maine

Rhode
Island

Total

Maine

Rhode
Island

1

25–3 (89.3)

13–0 (100.0)

38–3 (92.7)

58.4

63.4

2

22–2 (91.7)

11–2

(84.7)

33–4 (89.2)

57.4

61.5

3

15–3 (83.3)

10–2

(83.3)

25–5 (83.3)

60.5

58.6

4

12–2 (85.7)

4–5

(44.4)

16–7 (69.6)

57.3

53.3

5

4–5 (44.4)

6–2 (750.0)

10–7 (58.8)

54.9

56.6

6

4–2 (66.7)

3–1 (750.0)

7–3 (70.0)

49.6

59.1

7

2–1 (66.7)

2–1 (100.0)

4–2 (66.7)

55.5

48.6

8

0–1

(0.0)

2–0

(66.7)

2–1 (66.7)

48.9

57.0

No cases

3–1

(75.0)

3–1 (75.0)

—

52.8

9–12*

*There was only one year in the data set in which either state had a bond election with
more than eight bond issues on the ballot: Rhode Island (November 2004), which had
12. As all of these come from one year, and the number of cases is so small, I have
combined 9–12 in this table.
Two-state average, positions 1–5: 58.3 percent of the vote
Two -state average, positions 6–12: 52.8 percent of the vote
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As we have seen, voters
look skeptically on bonds that
seem to benefit only one narrow
place or interest. The story of
Issue 4 in Maine’s 2014 election
(which won 62.7 percent of the
vote) shows, however, that it is
possible to win a statewide
bond referendum that directly
benefits only one location if the
backers of the referendum can
show how it will benefit others.
Issue 4 asked the following:
“Do you favor a $10,000,000
bond issue, to be awarded
through a competitive process
and to be matched by
$11,000,000 in private and
other funds, to build a research
center and to discover genetic
solutions for cancer and the
diseases of aging, to promote
job growth and private sector
investment in this State, to
attract and retain young professionals and make the State a
60
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global leader in genomic medicine?” As Issue 4 shows,
bond proponents in Maine have become more aware of
the politics of wording proposals more persuasively.
Compare the Issue 4 of 2014 to the dry (typical for the
era) wording of the ill-fated Maine Route 6 bond in
1970: “Shall a bond issue be ratified for the purposes set
forth in ‘An Act Providing for a Bond Issue in the
Amount of Thirty Million Dollars to Reconstruct Route
6,’ passed by the 104th Legislature?”
The key point is that the direct beneficiary of the
2014 referendum was a single entity in a single location.
While the language of the bond mentioned a “competitive process,” it was widely understood that only one
facility had the ability to compete for this funding: the
Jackson Laboratory in Bar Harbor (Bell 2014).
Commentary on the issue generally assumed or explicitly stated this (see, for example, Bell 2014; Connors
2014; Levin 2014). In fact, the chief website advocating
for Issue 4 was hosted by Jackson Laboratory, featured
pictures of Jackson Laboratory, and under the category
of “About Us,” discussed exclusively the work of Jackson
Laboratory.
At $10 million, Issue 4 was tied for the most expensive with a bond for protection of drinking water that
year. Yet, only the drinking water bond did better at the
polls, with both getting well over 60 percent of the vote.
The success of Issue 4 shows a path to victory for bonds
directly benefitting only one location: emphasize how
the bond will help on matters that voters statewide care
about (cancer and jobs) more than the specific mechanics
of the proposal.
CONCLUSIONS

S

tatewide bond referenda around the country succeed
the vast majority of the time. Maine’s rate fits broadly
into the national figures and is similar to Rhode Island’s,
with about four out of five bonds passing. Since the
mid-1990s, Maine and Rhode Island bond referenda
have enjoyed an even higher rate of success. The era of
relatively high rates of failure in the early 1990s seems
to suggest that voter mood and the condition of a state’s
economy could be as significant as other factors (such as
the type of project under consideration) in bond success.
Certain types of bonds, including transportation bonds,
perform better than bonds for other subjects. More
often than not, the bonds pass at the polls, and we can
often tell when they are likely not to do so. -
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ENDNOTES
1

National Council of State Legislatures’ Ballot Measures
Database is available at http://www.ncsl.org/research
/elections-and-campaigns/ballot-measures-database
.aspx

2

Information about the Route 6 referenda can be found
on the Ballotpedia website: “Maine State Route 6
Reconstruction, Referendum Question No. 1 (1967).”
https://ballotpedia.org/Maine_State_Route_6
_Reconstruction,_Referendum_Question_No._1_(1967)

3

“Maine State Route 6 Reconstruction, Referendum
Question No. 1 (1970).” https://ballotpedia.org/Maine
_State_Route_6_Reconstruction,_Referendum_Question
_No._1_(1970)

4

Election results for 2016 drawn from “November 8,
2016—Referendum Election”, spreadsheet of election
results from the Maine Department of State.
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